


/ . I	ned Line boundary
7.2	Parameter: Maximum Building Heights & Plots
7.3	Parameter: Land Use - Ground Floor
7.4	Parameter: Land Use - Upper Floors
7.5	Parameter: Access and Circulation
7.6	Parameter: Landscape and Open Space
7.7	Illustrative Masterplan
7.8	Indicative Phasing

7.1 Location Plan

The red line boundary comprises the estate of the Beehive Centre and some areas of adopted highways that enable improvement works to the incoming highway, cycle and pedestrian connections.

The red line boundary area is 7.58 Hectares.



7.2 Parameter: Maximum Building Heights & Plots

The Maximum Building Heights and Plots plan sets out the key spatial constraints that will apply to any future reserved matters applications.

All heights shown are maximum values and are based on the illustrative scheme with some tolerance built in to allow minor changes to storey heights to accommodate sustainable structural solutions or higher performing MEP equipment.


Key minimum street widths and separation between building elements are based on the illustrative scheme with some degree of flexibility built in certain locations.

Plots are based on the illustrative scheme with a maximum offset of 3m to allow future flexibility to allow a response to any unforeseen future scenarios. Where massing is more sensitive this offset is reduced or removed.


Building footprints are able to change within the allocated plot provided that they do not exceed the maximum percentage occupation area defined on the plan, some scenarios of how this flexibility may work are shown below.

Massing set-backs at upper levels are more closely related to the illustrative scheme with little or no deviation. This is to secure key relationships that were defined during the pre-app consultation.

Laboratory fume extract flues are allowed for in 4 plots. These are controlled by a maximum height which is based on a best-practice factor of an additional 25% on top of the building height. The zones have been limited as much as possible at this stage of the design and based on the design development during pre-application consultation. Further restrictions on flues are set out in the Design Codes.



- 1. Block F, G, H, per the Illustrative Scheme.
- 2. Block F, G, H building footprints amended within the boundaries of the allocated plots. Minimum street widths are maintained.
- 3. Block F, G, H building footprints amended with greater flexibility, within the boundaries of the allocated plots. Minimum street widths are maintained.
- 4. Block F, G, H building footprints extended to maximum percentage occupation area. This is would not be permissible as it does not achieve the minimum street widths.




7.3 Parameter: Land Use - Ground Floor

Ground floor uses are defined by primary uses which are expected to occupy more than 50% of the ground floor area, including back of house areas.


Secondary uses are allowed for on a per building basis and designed to allow future flexibility of the masterplan, whilst generally not permitting a wholesale change of use from the illustrative material. Buildings may be brought forward without their designated secondary uses with reasonable justification for doing so.

Basements may be included in the reserved matters applications for any plot.



7.4 Parameter: Land Use - Upper Floor

Upper floors are predominantly E(g)(i) and E(g)(ii) Workplace use with the exception of any car or cycle parking structures or the community pavilion (Plot N)




7.5 Parameter: Access and Circulation

This plan shows the proposed network of routes around the site by to be used by each transport mode.

The plan defines the proposed framework of routes and does not represent exact locations.

Not shown on this plan but expected to be shown in reserved matters application are external short stay cycle parking locations, at-grade parking for accessible spaces and drop off, and any street-side service bays required for buildings without a dedicated service yard allocated to them on this plan.



7.6 Parameter: Landscape and Open Space

The landscape and open space shows defines areas of landscape into five categories based on a qualitative description provided on the plan. This plan sets the overarching strategy for the landscape masterplan and is based on the illustrative scheme.


The final design of the landscape and exact boundaries between the different Landscape Zones will be defined within reserved matters applications.



7.7 Illustrative Masterplan

This plan shows the landscape and ground floor of buildings of the illustrative scheme. Uses are defined by colour scheme and illustrate the strategies for defining a new local centre as described in this document.

Reserved matters applications are able to deviate from the illustrative scheme provided that they conform to the parameters set out in this application.




7.8 Indicative Phasing Plan

The Indicative Phasing Plan divides the site into the clusters of buildings that are likely to be brought forward within the five planned phases of development.

The plan should not be used to infer a construction programme or order of construction as this will be influenced throughout the construction period by a number of internal and external factors.

The enabling works phase indicates the intent to deliver improvements to site connectivity early within the construction programme alongside landscape improvements at the north of the site.






8.0 Appendix



Project Otter. Cambridge. Railpen.

SECURITY

DESIGN & ACESS STATEMENT CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES REVISION 01 - 26 MAY 2023



PROJECT OTTER SECURITY 4
RAILPEN DESIGN & ACESS STATEMENT -

REV. 01

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

This section represents the scheme for crime prevention measures for the Project Otter site.

1.2 Approach

A Security Risk Assessment (SRA) has been developed by Hoare Lea to identify the security needs for the site. This will form the basis for the crime prevention measures for the development and will identify several Operation Requirements (ORs) that will be co-ordinated with the client and the design team. Input has been obtained from the Cambridgeshire Constabulary Police - Designing Out Crime Officers, which has been incorporated into this report and into the scheme.

2. Secured by Design

From consultation with the Cambridgeshire Constabulary Police Design Out Crime Officer¹, it is understood that the Secured by Design (SbD) initiative will not be conditioned for planning. However, the principles to achieve SbD accreditation have been followed throughout the security design for the Project Otter site. Consequently, the Designing Out Crime Officers have identified the following key design principles that need to be developed and discussed with the design team. These will be developed and co-ordinated by Hoare Lea.

- Physical security measures on externally accessible doors (i.e. main entrances, final emergency escape exits and cycle store entrances). These doors are recommended to be rated LPS 1175 B3 (SR2). Note, if main entrances are to utilise revolving doors, then lesser standards such as EN 1627 RC3 will be acceptable. The MSCP vehicle access point (recommended to be a roller shutter) is recommended to be rated LPS 1175 B3 (SR2).
- It is recommended that the reception lobbies in all buildings incorporate turnstiles as a first line of control during standard operating hours. Note, where reception lobbies are linked to retail units, the access should not occur behind the secure line (i.e. turnstiles).
- Compartmentalisation is recommended to be applied to the circulation cores of each building to control access, with a focus on vertical compartmentalisation controlling access to each floor.
- Electronic security systems will be provided that deter, detect, delay and allow facility management to respond and recover. These electronic systems will likely include:
 - Electronic access control
 - Video surveillance systems
 - Audio and visual intercoms
- All cycle storage provided should provide the ability for 3-point locking (i.e. Sheffield stands)
- SbD principles for external designs, including uniformity of lighting and considerations for enhancing natural surveillance and specifying street furniture designs that mitigate ASB.

3. Focussed strategies

Crime prevention for the development will be strongly influenced by best practice guidance for the creation of sustainable and secure developments and communities. These include approaches such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and the SbD initiative described above. It will also incorporate those principles outlined in the Cambridge Local Plan and consider the newly issued Protect Duty Bill. The Cambridge Local Plan aims to create successful developments through high quality, accessible, inclusive and safe designs².

² For more information see Cambridge Local Plan: Section 7, Policy 56.



¹ Hoare Lea consulted with Dave Griffin & Jules Hanrahan on the 13th April 2023.

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DESIGN & ACESS STATEMENT - REV. 01

These best practice guidance and requirements all outline high level attributes that the Project Otter site is required to possess in order to successfully create safe and secure environments. These include:

- Operational management
- Access and connectivity
- Surveillance
- Structure and spatial arrangements
- Ownership and activity
- Physical protection
- Adaptability.

3.1 Operational management

The security of a site cannot solely rely upon physical and electronic security; the safety and security of a site is positively influenced by the quality of its general operational management, of which security management forms a part of.

The wider site (i.e. all buildings, MSCP, pavilion and external spaces) will be managed 24/7 by an on-site security team that operates out of a security control room located within the multi-storey car park (MSCP). The SCR will have the ability to monitor security systems such as view CCTV images 24/7, monitor access control notifications and receive intercom calls (to remotely release landlord-controlled doors and communicate with reception staff).

The reception for each building will be responsible for managing local operational processes, including visitor management, deliveries, contractors, waste management etc. The reception desks will also have the ability to monitor their respective security systems, including CCTV images and access control alarm notifications.

3.2 Access and connectivity

Clear distinctions between user groups will be created through physical barriers and access control methods (combination of electronic, physical and operational). It is essential that there is a separation between commercial tenant users and the general public. A layered security approach will be adopted to create a series of zones to provide this separation.

As a minimum two lines of control will be employed before any user can access commercial spaces (i.e. labs and offices). Retail FOH spaces will not be secured during standard operating hours to allow the general public free access. However, outside of standard operating hours the retail units are recommended to be secured.

It is recommended that some form of vehicle barrier (i.e. a rising arm barrier or external gates) is employed at the site perimeter to control vehicular access to the site out of operating hours from Coldhams Lane.

3.3 Surveillance

Surveillance will be achieved through a balance of natural and active surveillance (video surveillance Systems / CCTV). The optimisation of natural surveillance, through spaces that are well lit, are naturally overlooked by users, and has the increased benefit of reducing the need for active measures, whilst remaining an excellent deterrent for crime within that space.

Active surveillance will reinforce the natural surveillance as well as provide mitigation for those vulnerable areas of the development (i.e. points of ingress, reception lobbies, cycle stores, building curtilages and escape exits).

Surveillance, largely acts as a deterrent, helping to reduce the likelihood of many conventional crimes (i.e. trespass, theft and insider threat) from taking place. Furthermore, the ability of active surveillance to capture and identify individuals provides plenty of forensic support for any investigations into incidents that may have occurred on site.

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3.4 Structure and spatial arrangement

Conflict between users can occur within a development where there is no clear designated purpose of a space. Clear demarcation between the public realm, retail spaces and commercial areas should be achieved via dedicated pedestrian, cycle and vehicle access routes.

The following have been considered in relation to the spatial arrangements:

- The relationship between publicly accessible external areas and the site's buildings (including the pavilion)
- Reduction in secluded spaces and general arrangements in order to maximise natural surveillance
- External spaces benefiting from natural surveillance by introducing and maintaining clear sightlines
- Service yard and management of deliveries.

3.5 Ownership and activity

Safety and security of a site is enhanced where there is a clear understanding of what space is to be used for (i.e. its primary activity) and where the sense of ownership lies. There will be clear ownership of external spaces, retail units, the pavilion, commercial buildings, cycle routes and vehicle access roads. Robust waste and delivery strategies for both retail and commercial areas should be developed such that the ownership of back of house spaces and the service yards are clearly identifiable.

3.6 Physical protection

Physical protection of assets within the development has been identified in the Security Risk Assessment and has been developed in accordance with the SbD principles specified above.

Additional physical security to control and manage vehicle access to site realm should also be considered and designed into the scheme, such that the site is in compliance with the Protect duty legislation.

3.7 Adaptability

Safety and security of a development is enhanced where there is adaptability within the space to manage changes in security needs.

The layering of security within the development allows for a more robust security posture to be adopted should certain threats increase through the life of the development or ownership change. Furthermore, access permissions can be tightened within the electronic access control system, to restrict access to authorised users should the risk to the development change.



